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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Three key states are relevant in considering future nuclear
proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and
Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their
relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. For historical and
geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to
reactivate nuclear weapons programs.
Venezuela’s
President, Hugo Chávez, has repeatedly demonstrated
interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela
lacks any serious nuclear expertise. Even if it had the
managerial and technological capacity, the lead-time to
develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured
in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from
international sources would be difficult because members of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards, and
potential non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suppliers are
highly surveilled, risking the exposure of such a program
before Venezuela could put a deterrent into place.
While South American states have historically opposed
nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina
would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation.
Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers
that are deeply embedded in a regional security community.
On the other hand, Venezuela under President Chávez is
perceived as a revisionist power seeking a transformation of
the international system. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear
weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and
Colombia, and it would prompt nuclear weapons
development by Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for
reasons of preserving regional leadership and prestige than
for fear of a Venezuelan threat.

1

INTRODUCTION
Currently three key actors are relevant in considering future
nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil,
and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of
their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. Argentina has
successfully exported nuclear technology to four other
countries, and Brazil is one of only a very small group of
countries to have mastered and achieved operational
capability to execute the complete nuclear fuel cycle. 1
However, for historical and legal reasons, neither country is
likely to pursue the development of nuclear explosive
devices in the foreseeable future. Venezuela lacks any
capability in the nuclear technology arena, but has declared
the intention to acquire a civilian nuclear power program. Its
president, Hugo Chávez also has repeatedly stated that it
considers the United States the principal external threat to
the security of the Bolivarian revolution, which has led some
outside observers to raise the possibility that Venezuela may
be interested in more than civilian nuclear power. On the
other hand, Venezuela has no operational nuclear reactor or
any domestic cadre of nuclear scientists with which to
initiate a program.2
However unlikely, this does not mean that states in the
region would never undertake nuclear proliferation. There is
1

Mary Beth Nikitin, Anthony Andrews and Mark Holt, “Managing the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear
Power,” Congressional Research Service RL34234, March 2, 2011. For a
more detailed review of the evolution of nuclear proliferation networks in
South America, see Harold A. Trinkunas, “Assessing Potential
Proliferation Networks in Latin America: 2006-2016,” The
Nonproliferation Review 13.3 (November 2006): 617-625.
2
Sam Logan and Julio Cirino, „„Venezuelan Nuclear Technology is a
Long Shot,‟‟ ISN Security Watch, October 26 2005,
http://www.samuellogan.com/articles/venezuelan-nuclear-technology-isa-long-shot.html.
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the possibility, however remote, that dramatic shifts in the
international system would change the threat perception
amongst the elites in Argentina and Brazil and lead them to
pursue weaponization of their nuclear technology.
Venezuela‟s President, Hugo Chávez, already perceives a
hostile international system, one in which he believes that
the leading power, the United States, seeks to overthrow
him. Other states with similar threat perceptions – Iran and
North Korea – followed the path towards nuclear weapons
systems when their leaders held similar beliefs and sought a
useful deterrent.
This paper is designed to logically assess the implications of
an admittedly improbable scenario: that Brazil, Argentina, or
Venezuela might decide to pursue functional nuclear
explosive devices coupled to reliable delivery systems. In
the event that these States were to acquire such systems, the
implications for regional relations are mixed. Brazil and
Argentina are both territorially and geopolitically satisfied
powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security
community. While South American states have historically
opposed the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region,
the acquisition of such weapons by Brazil and Argentina
would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation, and
it would be unlikely to provoke further nuclear proliferation
in the region. On the other hand, under the administration of
President Chávez, Venezuela has become a revisionist power
in the international system, seeking a multi-polar world in
which the power of the United States is constrained.
Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met
with alarm by the United States and Colombia (its historic
rival), and it would prompt nuclear weapons development by
Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for reasons of
preserving regional leadership and prestige than for fear of a
Venezuelan threat.
3

THREAT PERCEPTIONS, NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
Overall, the probability of further nuclear proliferation in
Latin America is low because the combination of both
capability and intention to develop nuclear forces is not
found in any of the possible proliferators. The two countries
that have the capability to pursue such a program, Argentina
and Brazil, gave up the pursuit of nuclear weapons two
decades ago, and they are not likely to resume this path
given their historical experience and the geopolitical threat
environment. Venezuela, whose intentions in the nuclear
arena are suspected by some, lacks all indigenous capability
to pursue nuclear weapons development at this time. Even
with the assistance of outside powers, the likelihood that it
could put such a system in place undetected within the next
ten to twenty years is almost nil. While Argentina, Brazil
and Venezuela have been on friendly terms during the past
decade, there is no indication that they have any interest in
helping Venezuela obtain nuclear weapons. Moreover, the
possibility that non-State actors (such as the private sector or
organized crime) within Argentina and Brazil might form
part of such a network without State knowledge, as has been
detected in the former Soviet Union states and demonstrated
by the A. Q. Khan network, is lower than in many other
regions of the world because of two decades of nuclear
mutual confidence-building and mutual inspection through
permanent bi-national agency, Agência Brasileiro-Argentina
de Contabilidade e Côntrole de Materiais Nucleares
(ABACC). This agency monitors all nuclear stockpiles and
facilities in these two countries, and it would be likely to
detect theft of nuclear technology or materials.
For the foreseeable future, Argentina and Brazil are unlikely
to resume efforts to acquire nuclear weapons without some
revolutionary change in the international system that would
4

lead them to perceive an existential threat to the state. The
initial rationale for abandoning the pursuit of nuclear
weapons in Argentina and Brazil was to safeguard
democracy.
Nuclear development had been heavily
influenced by the military in both countries, and civilian
leaders of the newly democratic states stripped the armed
forces of control of nuclear programs in the 1980s. These
programs, some of which had the potential to lead to nuclear
weapons, had been shrouded in secrecy and were
unaccountable both under civilian governments and military
dictatorships.3
The developing security community in the Southern Cone,
taking the form of UNASUR in its latest evolution, means
that any territorial defense or deterrence rationales for
nuclear weapons acquisition have faded. The resolution of
all territorial disputes between the major regional powers
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile), and ongoing mutual confidencebuilding measures, limit the possibility that new conflict
dynamics will lead States in the region to seek nuclear
weapons. Of the two powers with indigenous nuclear
technology industries, Brazil‟s constitution bans the
development of nuclear weapons, and both Argentina and
Brazil are committed to sophisticated nuclear safeguards
through the ABACC. 4
Even though they are unlikely to proliferate, Argentina and
Brazil are the two countries to watch since they have the
capability to seek nuclear weapons should their intentions
change. During the 2000s, left-center governments with
3

Michael Barletta, The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil, Working
paper, Centre for International Security and Arms Control, Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 1997.
4
Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “The Brazilian Way: Negotiation and
Symmetry in Brazil‟s Nuclear Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review,
Vol. 17, No. 3, 2010.
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strong nationalist credentials in Argentina and Brazil have
sought to rekindle their civilian nuclear programs. There are
occasional signals in Brazil that indicate that there is a
constituency among its elites for further nuclear technology
development with military purposes (a nuclear-powered
submarine force), if not for nuclear explosive devices.
During his administration, President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da
Silva of Brazil spoke of greatly expanding his country‟s use
of nuclear power, including building new reactors.5 Brazil
has also resisted signing the Additional Protocols of the
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would allow more
thorough International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspections. Given Brazil‟s historical insistence on equality
and reciprocity in its international relations, it is unlikely to
sign the Additional Protocols due to the inherently unequal
treatment that nuclear and non-nuclear weapons powers
receive under the NPT. Brazil‟s ongoing struggle with the
IAEA over the inspection of its enrichment facilities has
raised eyebrows as well.6 Argentina has exported nuclear
technology four times in its history, and given that it could
earn more than $500 million from a new sale, the incentive
to do so again is clear. In both cases, rising energy costs
have been used to justify the expansion of civilian nuclear
power programs. Another important consideration is that for
these strongly nationalist governments, nuclear power is a
symbol of modernity, technological autonomy, and
sovereignty.7 However, this has to be balanced against the

5

Federation of American Scientists, „„OSC Analysis: Brazil Nuclear
Program Remains on Hold Amid Cabinet Debate,‟‟ April 5 2006, FAS
Web Site, www.fas.org/nuke/guide/brazil/osc040506.html_/.
6
Irma Arguello, “The Position of an Emerging Global Power,” The
Nonproliferation Review 18:1 (2011), 183-200.
7
Etel Solingen, “The political economy of nuclear restraint,”
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2, (1994):126-69. Sarah J. Diehl and
Eduardo Fujii, “Brazil's New National Defense Strategy Calls for
Strategic Nuclear Developments,” James Martin Center for
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reality that the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear programs are
plagued with cost overruns and delays. In the Argentine case
in particular, repeated economic crises during the 1990s and
2000s have led to a seriously under-resourced nuclear
program.8
Even though it lacks almost any capability to develop
nuclear technology at this time, assessing Venezuela‟s future
as a nuclear proliferation risk is difficult because of its
leader‟s periodic declarations of a desire to develop a nuclear
power program have not been matched with improving
capabilities. In the 2005, Venezuela began discussions with
its MERCOSUR partners, Argentina and Brazil, about
acquiring nuclear power reactors, although these negotiations
were unproductive.9 Since then, it has sought actively to
further collaboration with Russia on the development of a
nuclear energy program, signing a nuclear cooperation
agreement in 2008. There have also been discussions of
possible cooperation with Belarus and France in the area of
nuclear technology.10 Perhaps paving the way for its own
future activities, Venezuela has taken positions on
proliferation issues that run directly against the mainstream
of international public opinion, pursuing a highly publicized
rapprochement with Iran, a potential nuclear supplier, and
supporting both Iran‟s right to pursue nuclear technology
without constraints and North Korea‟s periodic missile tests.
It has also opposed international sanctions over nuclear
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, 30
October 2009.
8
Logan and Cirino, “Venezuelan Nuclear Technology is a Long Shot,”
opp. Cit.
9
Larry Rohter and Juan Forero, „„Venezuelan Leader Eager to Start
Nuclear Program,‟‟ The New York Times. November 27 2005,
www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/27/news/chavez.php_/.
10
Víctor Álvarez Riccio, “Venezuela Nuclear: Análisis de Riesgo,”
October 24, 2010, http://www.analitica.com/especiales/1596346.asp,
(accessed February 24, 2011).
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issues on both powers. 11 Venezuela‟s stated concern of a
U.S. invasion has led it to officially orient its Armed Forces
towards a policy of prolonged popular war and asymmetric
warfare. This has translated into changes in doctrine and
educational programs, and the creation of a militia.12
Certainly, nuclear forces would be the ultimate deterrent
against outside intervention.
Taken together, these factors have led some outside
observers to claim that Venezuela is a potential nuclear
proliferation risk. If we evaluate the contemporary domestic
and international political context, it seems unlikely. At the
international level, Argentina and Brazil have reacted very
cautiously to the Venezuelan nuclear proposal. On the one
hand, they would like the business for economic reasons, but
on the other they are concerned about Chávez‟s ambitions.
As members of the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSP), Argentina and Brazil are likely to insist on strong
international safeguards on any nuclear technology sold to
Caracas.13 However, neither the Argentine nor the Brazilian
governments have opposed Venezuela‟s nuclear ambitions
publicly, both because they are vulnerable domestically on
their left flank, where Hugo Chávez has numerous
sympathizers, and because internationally they still have
common economic interests with Venezuela.
Other potential suppliers of nuclear technology are also
problematic for Venezuela. Members of the NSG such as
France or even Russia are likely to insist on strong oversight
11

Sarah J. Diehl, “Venezuela‟s Search for Nuclear Power -or Nuclear
Prestige,” Issue Brief, Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 7 2009.
12
Harold A. Trinkunas, “Defining Venezuela‟s „Bolivarian Revolution,‟”
Military Review 85 (July-August. 2005),
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/J
ulAug05/Btri.pdf_/, pp. 39_44.
13
Logan and Cirino, “Venezuelan Nuclear Technology is a Long
Shot,”op. Cit.
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of any Venezuelan nuclear program, and the United States
has conceded that a peaceful civilian nuclear program would
be unobjectionable if strong safeguards were in place. 14
However, given President Chávez‟s nationalist tendencies,
Venezuela might try to avoid accepting strong oversight and
seek assistance from non-NSG countries.
Some
commentators have pointed to Iran and North Korea as
potential partners for Venezuela, but neither country has a
track record of successfully exporting its nuclear
technology.15 Also, their programs are among the most
highly surveilled in the world, increasing the probability that
any such partnership would be quickly exposed to the
international community, at great risk to all involved.
On the domestic front, there is no constituency for a nuclear
program in Venezuela outside of Chávez‟s inner circle. The
stated objective of increasing energy resources is not
credible to most Venezuelans, who see their country as one
of the richest in oil and hydroelectric energy resources in the
world. The Chávez administration has carefully avoided any
public statements about acquiring nuclear technology as a
means to deter external aggression, and there is no public
groundswell in favor of such development, as has occurred
in Iran.16 There are no bureaucratic structures in Venezuela
that promote the acquisition of nuclear power. The country‟s
civilian nuclear research program was dismantled decades
ago, so there is no scientific constituency advocating such a
program. Historically, there has been no constituency within
the Armed Forces that seeks to acquire nuclear technology
for military purposes. As the history of nuclear technology
14

Howard LaFranchi, “U.S. Unfazed by Venezuela‟s Talk Nukes,”
Christian Science Monitor, October 13 2005,
www.csmonitor.com/2005/1013/p02s02-usfp.html_/.
15
Joshua Kucera, “What is Hugo Chávez Up To?” The Wilson Quarterly
35. 2 (Spring 2011): 22-30.
16
Harold A. Trinkunas, “Venezuelan Strategic Culture,” Findings Report
1, Applied Research Center, Florida International University, 2009.
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development in Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, and India
suggests, a constituency inside and outside of government
favoring nuclear development is a critical element in
ensuring its continuity, while also realizing that mastering
the needed technology can take decades. To succeed, any
nuclear program would have to extend well beyond the
tenure of Chávez, even if he wins the 2012 presidential
elections and his personal health recovers.17
Venezuela also lacks the technical or managerial capacity for
a nuclear technology development program even if Chávez
or his successors had the political will to pursue it. It is true
that in the past, Venezuela has maintained sophisticated
industrial and scientific development programs, especially
within its oil industry. However, the 2003 oil industry strike
and the mass purge of upper- and mid-level employees from
the industry by the government have greatly reduced the
managerial and technical talent pool on which the
Venezuelan government could draw.18 The absence of any
pool of nuclear scientists to contribute to sustaining such a
program means Caracas would essentially have to start such
a program from scratch. It would also require investing in
educating a cadre of scientists and technology workers. This
would lengthen the time horizon to the acquisition of any
kind of indigenous nuclear program, and would require the
Chavez administration to change its attitude towards expert
knowledge. The decisions made by President Chávez
repeatedly demonstrate that political criteria trump technical
competence and bureaucratic autonomy in today‟s
Venezuela, much to the detriment of many of the programs
the Venezuelan government has undertaken since 1999.
17

“Hugo Chávez defies illness to run for re-election in 2012,”
www.guardian.co.uk, 25 July 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/25/hugo-chavez-illnesselection-venezuela.
18
Álvarez Riccio, 2010.
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REGIONAL REACTIONS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ACQUISITION
Latin America has been a hotbed of liberal international
institution building, ranging from the Organization of
American States through various regional economic forums
and pacts such as the United Nations Economic Commission
for Latin America (ECLA) and MERCOSUR, and new
initiatives such as UNASUR and the South American
Defense Council. The international regime prohibiting the
development and acquisition of nuclear weapons in South
America is particularly robust, resting on the 1967 Treaty of
Tlatelolco that initiated the process of creating a nuclear
weapons free zone in the region.19 However, there are also a
number of failed or ineffective international regimes in the
diplomatic history of the region, and the acquisition of
nuclear weapons ― however unlikely it seems at present ―
would represent a „realist shock‟ to the system that would
undoubtedly cause some regional powers to reconsider their
adherence to a nuclear weapons-free regime.
Nuclear weapons acquisition by a South American State
would lead its neighbors to reconsider their own security,
much as realist or neorealist international relations theory
describes, and decide whether they should conciliate the new
nuclear weapons State or balance against it. Some would
consider strengthening military and other capabilities or react
by fostering alliances to balance threats, particularly when
the State acquiring nuclear weapons is perceived as having
offensive intentions.20 Stephen Walt argues that States do
not just pay attention to relative capabilities when making
19

Héctor Gros Espiell, “Contribución del Tratado de Tlatelolco al
Desarme Nuclear y la No Proliferación,” Anuario Mexicano de Derecho
Internacional, Vol. VIII (2008): 541-552.
20
Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World
Power,” International Security 9.4 (Spring 1985): 3-43.
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calculations of threat, but also the identity and nature of
other powers, particularly whether their intentions are
offensive or benign. When it comes to the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by Argentina, Brazil or Venezuela, clearly,
the perceptions of States in the region as to the intentions of
these countries in acquiring the weapons would play a
significant part in determining their reactions.
A current thought about international relations in the
developing world, the so-called „peripheral realism‟,
suggests that anarchy is not really an accurate description of
the international system, and it argues that States play
different roles in the system: order-givers (developed core
States), order-takers (peripheral States that accept the
existing international order even though they do not reap the
same rewards as core States), and order-breakers (peripheral
States that seek to change the international status quo). At
various points in Latin America‟s history, States in the
region have migrated to the order-breaker category: Cuba in
1959, Nicaragua in 1979, and Argentina from 1976-1987 (at
least in terms of missile proliferation).21 Order-breaking
countries, including Venezuela with its long-range
international objectives, tend to have fraught and conflictive
relations with order-makers, such as the United States, in the
international system. Neither Argentina nor Brazil falls into
the category of „order-breaking‟ States at this time, and
Brazil certainly aspires to the status of „order-maker.‟
Of the three States under consideration in this paper, Brazil
is the least unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons in the next
two decades since it already has the necessary capability, and
21

Carlos Escudé, “An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and Its
Implications for the Interstate System: Argentina and the Cóndor II
Missile Project,” in Stephanie G. Neuman, (ed.) International Relations
Theory and the Third World, New York: NY, St. Martin‟s Press, 1998):
55-76.
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at least some members of its political establishment have
publicly voiced their support for such a move. On the other
hand, Brazil is a territorially satisfied power with few border
disputes of any significance with its neighbors. It is difficult
to imagine a geopolitical threat scenario that would lead
Brazil to acquire nuclear weapons for either defensive or
offensive purposes. It is much more powerful militarily than
any of its neighbors and it is protected by its geography
―along much of its extensive land border and by South
America‟s remoteness from other great powers. Rather, it is
much more likely that Brazil‟s aspirations to being a modern
great power and irritation with lack of progress towards
global nuclear disarmament under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, would lead it to acquire nuclear
weapons for symbolic reasons. Given South America‟s
status as a nuclear-weapons free zone, Brazil would face a
regional diplomatic backlash, but it is unlikely that other
countries in the region would respond by acquiring their own
nuclear weapons because they perceive Brazil‟s international
orientation as basically defensive. The Brazilian government
would likely also face a domestic backlash since its
constitution forbids the acquisition of nuclear weapons and
there is little public support for such a step.22
The only circumstance under which the Argentine
government might face some internal pressure to develop a
nuclear weapons program of its own would be in response to
a Brazilian decision to acquire such forces. Here, its latent
competition with Brazil, concern over Brazilian rearmament,
and own pursuit of prestige could conceivably prompt a
reinvigoration of its nuclear programs. However, the
profoundly anti-militarist cast of public opinion in
Argentina, the continuing civilian elite distrust of the
military, and the prospective cost of the program would
generally discourage such a move. Under such
22

Arguello, 2011, pp. 193-194.
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circumstances, Argentina might simply decide to bandwagon
with Brazil when it comes to security issues, much as it
already does, and use the mechanisms in ABACC to achieve
some level of confidence as to the status of a developing
Brazilian arsenal.
Any Venezuelan indigenous acquisition of nuclear weapons
is very far off. It essentially has no active program at this
time, and even if Chávez‟s declarations of a joint search for
uranium with Iranian assistance were true, it would simply
confirm how preliminary the preparations for a nuclear
program are in Venezuela.
On the other hand, the
importation of nuclear technology would be a highly risky
operation given that the most likely suppliers are also under
the high degree of intelligence surveillance by interested
powers. Still, if Venezuela were to acquire a nuclear weapon
and a delivery system, regional and global reaction would be
different from that described for the Brazil and Argentina
cases. Simply put, Venezuela is viewed as a revisionist
power, an „order-breaker‟, and as such, its intentions would
not necessarily be viewed as defensive. There would
certainly be regional criticism for breaching the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, although Venezuela‟s allies in the ALBA
(alliance of countries that support Chávez) would mute it. In
addition, it is hard to believe that Brazil would ignore such a
development. Such an event would be perceived as an
affront to Brazilian great power status ambitions and
regional leadership, and this in turn might garner enough
public opinion and elite support to proceed to rapid
development of nuclear weapons. For Argentina, a similar
logic holds, although widespread anti-militarism and a
weaker economic base on which to support a nuclear
weaponization program would discourage follow through.
Colombia would also be highly concerned, given its historic
rivalry with Venezuela. Similarly to Venezuela, it lacks any
indigenous nuclear capability, so in the face of a Venezuelan
14

nuclear program, it would have to decide whether to seek
support from outside powers, or simply bandwagon with
Venezuela by adopting a conciliatory stance. Generally, the
economic and political advantages for Colombia of being on
good terms with Venezuela are such that it would require
quite provocative behavior for the Colombian government to
try to balance against Venezuelan nuclear power.
The United States would face important choices in any of
these proliferation scenarios. These States would have
acquired nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, and the United States would have to
decide the degree to which it should mobilize the
international community to sanction violators. Given that
Brazil is perceived as a power with a defensive orientation, a
consolidated democratic regime, and a growing international
powerhouse, the United States might simply seek an
understanding or accommodation that would avoid more
than symbolic sanctions. Similar considerations would apply
in the very unlikely event that Argentina would acquire
nuclear weapons, although Argentina‟s history of erratic
foreign policy behavior would lead U.S. policymakers to a
higher level of concern, and they would also feel less
constrained about pursuing sanctions given Argentina‟s
relatively smaller role in the international system compared
to Brazil. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would
raise very serious concerns in the United States, not because
of the prospect that Venezuela would employ such forces
offensively but because of the deterrent they create. Under
such a shield, President Chávez might feel more confident in
pursuing a campaign of petro-diplomacy and covert financial
and military assistance to friendly governments and political
movements. Given President Chávez‟s tendency towards
bombast, there would certainly be a great deal of drama and
angst that would feed the public opinion debate in the United
States over how to approach a newly nuclearized Venezuela,
15

and this would put U.S. policymakers in an awkward
position domestically, not just internationally.
CONCLUSIONS
Argentina and Brazil are likely to remain nuclear technology
powers and continue to pursue further research in this
domain. Nationalist leaders in both countries are interested
in sustaining their nuclear programs as an economic resource
and a means to demonstrate sovereignty and technological
independence. However, they currently have no interest in
introducing nuclear weapons into the region, and they are
likely to continue supporting a reasonable international
nonproliferation regime. Given their proven ability to
develop nuclear technology to a substantial level of
sophistication, Argentina and Brazil remain potential nuclear
proliferators because they have capability to move towards
weaponization in years rather than decades.
In the Venezuelan case, despite the intentions of its
leadership, there is a low risk for successful nuclear
proliferation because of strong international and domestic
constraints. Venezuela lacks any serious domestic nuclear
development program, and starting and operating such
programs is expensive and requires a lead-time of decades
before achieving success. Given the resources that Chávez
has at his disposal, a small possibility remains that
Venezuela could acquire nuclear technology through some
sort of turnkey arrangement with an existing supplier. If this
were to be provided by a member of the NSG, then the
probability of diversion of this technology for non-peaceful
purposes is low because of the scarcity of Venezuela‟s
managerial and technical capacity and absence of nuclear
expertise. If a non-member of the NSG, which would not
require international safeguards, provided it, then Venezuela
and its supplier would face the risk of discovery well before
16

a fully functional nuclear weapons program could be
established. This gap between discovery and the acquisition
of a deterrent would leave Venezuela highly vulnerable to
action by the international community.

17

WORKS CITED
Álvarez R., Víctor, “Venezuela Nuclear: Análisis de
Riesgo,” October 24, 2010,
http://www.analitica.com/especiales/1596346.asp
(accessed February 24, 2011).
Arg ello, Irma “The Position of an Emerging Global
Power,” The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 18, No 3,
2011.
Barletta, Michael „„The Military Nuclear Program in
Brazil,‟‟ Working paper, Centre for International
Security and Arms Control, Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 1997.
Diehl, Sarah J. “Venezuela‟s Search for Nuclear Power - or
Nuclear Prestige,” Issue Brief, Nuclear Threat
Initiative, May 7 2009.
_____. and Eduardo Fujii, “Brazil's New National Defense
Strategy Calls for Strategic Nuclear
Developments,” James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute for
International Studies, October 30 2009.
Escudé, Carlos, “An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and
Its Implications for the Interstate System: Argentina
and the Cóndor II Missile Project,” in Stephanie G.
Neuman (ed.) International Relations Theory and the
Third World, (New York: NY, St. Martin‟s Press,
1998).

18

Federation of American Scientists, “OSC Analysis: Brazil
Nuclear Program Remains on Hold Amid Cabinet
Debate,” April 5 2006,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/brazil/osc040506.html
.
Gros Espiell, Héctor “Contribución del Tratado de Tlatelolco
al Desarme Nuclear y la No Prolifer-ación,” Anuario
Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, Vol. VIII
(2008): 541-552.
Harold A. Trinkunas, “„Defining Venezuela‟s „Bolivarian
Revolution,‟” Military Review 85, July-August, 2005,
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/d
ownload/English/JulAug05/ Btri.pdf/.
_____. “Venezuelan Strategic Culture,” Findings Report 1,
Applied Research Center, Florida International
University, 2009.
“Hugo Chávez defies illness to run for re-election in 2012,”
www.guardian.co.uk, 25 July 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/25/hugochavez-illness-election-venezuela.
Kucera, Joshua, “What is Hugo Chávez Up To?” The Wilson
Quarterly 35, No. 2 (Spring 2011): 22-30.
LaFranchi, Howard “U.S. Unfazed by Venezuela‟s Talk
Nukes,” Christian Science Monitor, October 13,
2005, www.csmonitor.com/2005/1013/p02s02usfp.html_/.

19

Logan, Sam and Julio Cirino, „„Venezuelan Nuclear
Technology is a Long Shot,‟‟ ISN Security Watch,
October 26 2005,
http://www.samuellogan.com/articles/venezuelannuclear-technology-is-a-long- shot.html.
Nikitin, Mary Beth, Anthony Andrews and Mark Holt,
“Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Implications of
Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power,”
Congressional Research Service RL34234, March 2,
2011.
Rohter, Larry and Juan Forero, „„Venezuelan Leader Eager
to Start Nuclear Program,‟‟ The New York Times,
November 27 2005,
www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/27/news/chavez.php_/
Santos Vieira de Jesus, Diego. "The Brazilian Way:
Negotiation and Symmetry in Brazil‟s Nuclear
Policy." The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 17, No.
3, 2010.
Solingen, Etel “The Political Economy of Nuclear
Restraint,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2,
1994.
Trinkunas, Harold A., “Assessing Potential Proliferation
Networks in Latin America: 2006- 2016,” The
Nonproli-feration Review, 13.3 (November 2006):
617-625.
Walt, Stephen M., “Alliance Formation and the Balance of
World Power,” International Security 9.4 (Spring
1985): 3-43.

20

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Harold Trinkunas is an Associate Professor and Chair of
the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His research
has focused on Latin American politics, particularly on civilmilitary relations and democratization. His recent
publications include “Civilian Praetorianism and Military
Shirking during Constitutional Crises in Latin America”
(with David Pion-Berlin, Comparative Politics, July 2010),
“Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy
in Latin America,” (with David Pion-Berlin, Latin American
Research Review 42.3, 2007) and Crafting Civilian Control
of the Military in Venezuela (University of North Carolina
Press, 2005). He co-edited and contributed to Ungoverned
Spaces: Alternatives to Governance in an Era of Softened
Sovereignty (Stanford University Press, 2010), Global
Politics of Defense Reform (Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), and
Terrorism Financing and State Responses (Stanford
University Press, 2007). Professor Trinkunas received his
Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University in 1999
after conducting field research in Argentina and Venezuela.

21

WHEMSAC PUBLICATIONS
PHASE II
Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Human Security and Crime in Latin
America: The Political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies.”
September 2011.
Lilian Bobea, “Democratizing Violence: The Case of the
Dominican Republic.” August 2011.
Douglas Farah, “Mapping Transnational Crime in El
Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia.” August
2011.
Erich de la Fuente, “The Current State of Argentina's Oil
Industry.” August 2011.
Genaro Arriagada and Patricia I. Vásquez, “Perspectives on
Latin America‟s Energy Security.” August 2011.
Adriana Moreno Blanco, “Food Security in Latin America,”
August 2011.
Orlando J. Pérez, “The Basis of Support for Hugo Chávez:
Measuring the Determinants of Presidential Job Approval in
Venezuela.” August 2011.
J. Mark Ruhl, “Guatemala: A Failing State?” July 2011.
Hugo Corrales Compagnucci, “Armed Groups and Violence
in Paraguay.” July 2011.
Luis Bitencourt, “The Security Challenges for the 2016: Rio
de Janeiro Olympic Games.” July 2011.
22

Carmen Rosa de León-Escribano, “Capabilities of Police and
Military Forces in Central America: A Comparative Analysis
of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.” July
2011.
Rodolfo F. Robles-Montoya, “The Use of the Military for
Law Enforcement Activities in Central America.” June 2011.
Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, “The Re-Emergence of Suriname‟s
Désiré (Desi) Bouterse: Political Acumen and Geopolitical
Anxiety.” June 2011.
Paola Prado, “The Impact of the Internet in Six Latin
American Countries.” June 2011.
Harold Trinkunas, “International Bolivarianism and its
Influence.” June 2011.
David Scott Palmer and Alberto Bolívar, “Peru‟s Shining
Path: Recent Dynamics and Future Prospects.” May 2011.
Erich de la Fuente, “ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela‟s
Foreign Policy.” May 2011.
Norman Munroe, “Climate Change and Regions at Risk: A
Look at Central America.” May 2011.
Juan Pablo Sarmiento & Gabriela Hoberman, “Disaster Risk
Management Disparity in the Caribbean: Evidence from
Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago.” May 2011.
Daniel E. Moreno, “The Indigenous in Plurinational Bolivia:
Perceptions of Indigenous People in Bolivia Before and
During the Morales Government.” April 2011.
23

Raúl L. Madrid, “Indigenous Movements, Democracy, and
U.S. Interests in Latin America.” April 2011.
Thomas Bruneau, “An Analysis of the Implications of Joint
Military Structures in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
Colombia.” April 2011.
Rut Diamint, Pablo Policzer and Michael Shifter, “Latin
American Coups: Have They Vanished or Taken New
Shapes?” March 2011.
Antonio L. Mazzitelli, “The New Transatlantic Bonanza:
Cocaine on Highway 10.” March 2011.
Carlos Pereira, “Brazil Under Dilma Rousseff: Similar
Policy Directions Maintained.” March 2011.
Patricio Navia, “Venezuela and Chile: Two opposite Paths of
Democratic Consolidation and Economic Development.”
March 2011.
Miguel L. Castillo-Girón, “Land Ownership Transfers in
Petén, Guatemala.” February 2011.
ARC, “Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and
Beyond.” February 2011.
Iñigo Guevara Moyano, “Defense Expenditures: Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay.” December 2010.
Bradley S. Porter, “Altered Landscapes or Arms Race?
Making Sense of Military Spending in
South America.” November 2010.
Iñigo Guevara Moyano, “Defense Expenditure: Andean and
Amazon Regions.” November 2010.
24

Ambassador Peter DeShazo, “Consolidating Security and
Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama.”
November 2010.
Johanna Mendelson-Forman, “South American Defense
Council: What it means for regional security?” November
2010.
Erich de la Fuente, “Cuba‟s Role in Venezuela‟s Control of
the Internet and Online Social Networks.” October 2010.
Marifeli Perez-Stable, “Raul Castro‟s Government: Recent
Economic Reforms and Some Political Considerations.”
October 2010.
Iñigo Guevara Moyano, “Defense Expenditures: Central
America and Dominican Republic.” September 2010.
Hal Brands, “Criminal Fiefdoms in Latin America:
Understanding the Problem of Alternatively Governed
Spaces.” September 2010.
ARC, “Honduras‟ Stressed Social Fabric: Instability and
Risks.” August 2010.
CTC and ARC, “Uranium in Latin America: Reserves,
Energy, and Security Implications.” August 2010.
John Proni, “Independent Monitoring of the Cuban
Economic Zone Oil Development.” July 2010.
Kristina Mani, “Military Entrepreneurship in Latin America:
A Brief Overview.” June 2010.
Bruce Bagley and Olga Nazario, “Lithium and Bolivia: The
Promise and the Problems.” June 2010.
25

Brian Fonseca, “Domestic Politics in the Dominican
Republic after the Earthquake in Haiti.” June 2010.
STUDENT PAPERS SERIES
Regina Joseph, “Rio and the Reds: The Comando Vermelho,
Organized Crime and Brazil‟s Economic Ascent.” September
2011.
Andreina Fernandez Fuenmayor, “The Rise of Native Voices
Against Natural Resource Extraction in Latin America.”
September 2011.
Antoine Perret, “Private Security Trends and Challenges in
Latin America.” August 2011.
PHASE I
Brian Fonseca, “Human Smuggling & The TerroristCriminal Nexus.” January 2009.
Arturo Contreras and Francisco Ledantec, “General
Overview of Transnational Threats in Latin America with a
Special Focus in South America & Its Effect on International
Security and US-Latin American Relations.” December
2008.
Thomas Bruneau, “Civil Military Relations in Democratic
Latin America.” December 2008.
Brian Fonseca, “Identifying Opportunities for US-Cuba
Military Cooperation.” December 2008.
Harold A. Trinkunas, “Understanding Venezuelan Strategic
Culture.” December 2008.
26

Joanna Mateo, “US-Brazil: Forging a New Relationship.”
November 2008.
Joanna Mateo, “Las Maras in Honduras.” November 2008.
Joanna Mateo, “Advancing Security Cooperation in the
Americas: An Historical Perspective.” August 2008.
Julio A. Cirino, “The Media Component in a Visual Culture
and the Spread of Populism in Latin America: Exploring the
Spiral of Silence.” June 2008.
Brian Fonseca and Evan Ellis, “Emerging Relationships:
China and Latin America.” May 2008.
Joanna Mateo, “Gang Violence in Central America: The
Case of Honduras. Identifying a Role for USSOUTHCOM.”
April 2008.
Anthony P. Maingot, “The New Geopolitics of the Andes:
The Dangers of a State-on-State War.” April 2008.
Joanna Mateo, “Health Threats to Stability in the Americas.”
February 2008.
Brian Fonseca, “Emerging Relationships: Iran & Latin
America.” February 2008.
Brian Fonseca, “Energy Outlook: Brazil.” January 2008.

27

